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Why	UK	banks	are	like	public	utilities	–	and	should
be	regulated	as	such
Banks	have	economic	features	similar	to	those	of	utility	service	providers	–	which	are	typically
regulated	more	heavily	than	other	companies	–	writes	Phil	Molyneux.	He		explains	how	banks
ought	to	be	regulated	with	this	point	in	mind,	and	concludes	that	greater	regulatory	oversight	of
bank	pricing	and	service	provision	is	necessary.
It	has	been	nearly	a	decade	since	the	global	financial	crisis	rocked	the	banking	world,	collapsing
major	banks,	resulting	in	massive	taxpayer	bailouts.	Since	then	UK	banking	has	been	impacted	by	a	variety	of
other	shocks	including	fallout	payment	protection	insurance	(PPI)	mis-selling	and	Libor,	and	other	rate	fixing
scandals.	Put	short,	it	has	been	a	litany	of	disaster.
Problems	in	UK	banking
Post	global	financial	crisis,	the	UK	economy	has	been	slow	to	grow	despite	accommodative	monetary	policy	(low
interest	rates	and	quantitative	easing).	Banks	have	also	been	hit	by	a	host	of	regulations	aimed	at	de-risking	their
business	and	improving	overall	soundness	and	governance.	This	has	added	to	costs	and	dragged	down	profits.
Royal	Bank	of	Scotland	remains	71%	owned	by	the	taxpayer,	while	in	May	2017	it	was	announced	that	the	last
government’s	holdings	in	Lloyds	had	been	sold	to	the	private	sector.
But	there	are	other	issues	rumbling	on,	and	these	vary	bank	by	bank.	Barclays	is	(still)	in	legal	wrangling	with
regard	to	the	support	it	received	from	one	of	the	Qatari	sovereign	wealth	funds	during	the	crisis.	HSBC	was
recently	fined	$175million	by	the	US	Fed	for	‘unsafe	and	unsound	practices’	in	its	FX	trading	activities	–	it	was
also	fined	a	lot	more	(with	five	other	banks)	for	similar	in	2014.	We	could	go	on.	The	regulators	have	been
successful	in	boosting	banking	system	soundness	and	limiting	excessive	risk-taking,	although	the	jury	on
improving	bank	conduct	is	still	‘out’.
The	problem	for	the	top	banks	is	that	they	are	now	highly	constrained	by	tougher	regulations	restricting	their	risk-
taking	(capital	and	liquidity	requirements	have	increased	markedly	since	the	crisis).	Adhering	to	regulations	–	so
called	compliance	costs	–	have	exploded.	The	sluggish	economy	and	low	interest	rate	level	also	do	not	help	–
faster	growing	economies	and	higher	interest	rates	always	boost	bank	profits.	So,	UK	banks	are	constrained	and
have	limited	growth	opportunities.	All	these	factors	together	mean	that	returns	(ROE)	have	been	consistently
single	digit	over	the	last	five	years	and	prospects	(especially	with	Brexit)	remain	muted.
The	top	banks	remain	big.	HSBC	has	consolidated	assets	size	close	to	that	of	the	country	GDP	(£2.1	trillion).
Barclays	was	just	as	big	a	few	years	back	but	it	has	shrunk	to	now	around	60%	of	the	size	of	the	economy.	RBS
and	Lloyds	follow	on	behind	with	balance	sheets	about	40%	of	UK	GDP.	Totting	up	just	for	these	four	banks
shows	that	combined	they	are	nearly	2.5	times	the	size	of	the	UK	–	so	they	still	pose	a	potential	systemic	threat
as	any	failure	would	have	such	serious	repercussions	that	the	state	would	still	have	to	step	in	to	bail	them	out.
As	already	noted,	numerous	new	rules	have	been	put	in	place	to	limit	bank	operations	including	moves	to	remove
executive	excesses	by	curtailing	their	remuneration	packages.	All	these	place	a	straightjacket	around	banker’s
activities	and	as	a	consequence	inhibit	their	freedom,	and	this	new	environment	has	led	some	to	talk	about	banks
being	no	more	like	private	free-wheeling	profit-maximising	firms,	but	more	like	public	utilities.	Or	to	put	another
way,	their	services	are	so	important	to	society	that	they	should	be	regulated	much	more	heavily	–	just	like	water,
electricity,	and	other	utilities.
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Why	banks	are	like	public	utilities
Public	utilities	have	various	economic	features	that	explain	why	they	are	typically	regulated	more	heavily	than
other	companies.	Typically,	these	businesses	have	a	common	network	structure	–	they	have	extensive
distribution	systems	(think	of	piping	for	gas	or	cabling	for	electricity)	that	involve	significant	investment	(known	as
large	sunk	costs)	that	can	be	government-	or	privately-owned.	Operations	of	utilities	usually	can	be	characterised
into	production,	transmission,	and	distribution.	These	three	stages	can	be	owned	by	public	or	private	firms.
Banking	has	similar	features	–	to	be	a	bank	and	undertake	production	you	need	a	banking	licence,	then	capital
and	deposits,	transmission	is	via	the	payments	system,	and	finally	distribution	is	through	online	portals	and
branches.	These	stages	are	typically	all	privately	owned	although	in	some	countries	(such	as	Brazil	and	China)
state	ownership	remains	important.
Why	we	regulate	utilities?
There	are	three	reasons	why	we	regulate	utilities.
1.	 Public	utilities	are	natural	monopolies	which	means	that	they	realise	scale	economies	indefinitely,	ultimately
leading	to	one	firm	in	the	industry.	In	natural	monopoly,	productive	efficiency	is	achieved	with	one	firm.
Because	utilities	tend	to	be	natural	monopolies,	consumers	need	to	be	protected	against	aggressive	pricing
(known	as	gouging)	and	other	bad	treatment,	hence	the	justification	for	regulation,	particularly	on	their
pricing,	products,	and	treatment	of	customers.	As	noted	above,	the	top	4	UK	banks	are	around	2.5	times	the
size	of	the	UK	economy	–	handful	of	banks	dominate	the	system.	There	have	been	moves	to	encourage	the
set-up	of	new	‘challenger’	banks	to	try	and	boost	competition	and	reduce	the	dominance	of	the	Big	4.	Metro
Bank	in	2010	was	the	first	to	obtain	a	full	banking	licence	in	over	a	century	and	six	new	banks	have	been
authorised	by	regulators	since	April	2013.	Despite	these	new	banks,	it	is	by	no	means	certain	whether	they
will	be	able	to	disrupt	the	status	quo;
2.	 To	stop	regulators	from	being	captured	by	producers.	The	aim	here	is	to	protect	all	producers	and	not	just
the	biggest,	by	making	sure	utilities	do	not	write	their	own	rules.	One	could	argue	that	in	banking	this	is	too
late:	big	banks	for	years	have	helped	write	the	rules	for	domestic	regulators.	The	big	banks	dominate	all
areas	of	retail	and	wholesale	activity	–	they	know	more	than	regulators.	Big	banks	also	gain	from	(implicit)
safety	net	benefits	(too-big-to-fail	banks	are	bailed	out	in	the	event	of	a	crisis);
3.	 Utilities	have	particular	economic	features.	Namely,	the	lowest	cost	operators	are	likely	to	be	biggest	rent
gainers	and	can	extract	significant	monopoly	profits.	Also,	utility	business	tends	to	have	a	high	level	of	cost-
based	cross-subsidization.	Also	monopoly	rents	are	likely	to	be	spread	among	a	handful	of	key	groups.	In
banking	it’s	easy	to	point	to	examples	of	previously	found	anti-competitive	pricing	behaviour	(lending	to
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small	businesses	and	retail	payments)	in	the	UK.	Cross-subsidization	is	widespread	(we	have	seen	cheap
retail	depositors	subsidizing	investment	banking	arms	of	the	big	UK	banks	prior	to	the	crisis).	And	who	has
been	the	key	groups	benefiting	from	their	operations?:	mainly	bank	executives	and	shareholders.	When
banks	perform	well	these	benefits	are	rarely	passed	onto	customers	in	the	form	of	lower	fees	or	loan	rates
or	higher	deposit	rates.
UK	banks	as	utilities
Bank	size	still	remains	an	issue	with	the	4	big	banks	having	combined	assets	two	and	half	times	larger	than	the
economy.	All	four	still	pose	a	potential	systemic	threat	and	so	they	have	to	be	regulated	accordingly.	Since	the
global	financial	crisis	they	have	been	de-risked,	with	tougher	capital,	liquidity,	executive	pay,	and	other	rules
curtailing	their	activities.	Banks	are	no	longer	free-wheeling	‘masters	of	the	universe’	–	they	have	been	forced	to
become	more	conservative	institutions	with	much	greater	government	oversight.	Returns	have	been	reduced	so
much	that	even	these	now	resemble	the	heavily	regulated	low	returns	of	utilities	compared	to	old	style	banks.
There	is	evidence	of	regulatory	capture	(or	at	least	barriers	to	capture	are	low),	cross-subsidization	is	widespread
and	there	are	still	pockets	of	monopoly	rent-seeking	(the	UK	competition	authorities	investigated	small	firm
lending	and	retail	payments	again,	in	2015,	finding	evidence	of	price	gouging).
All	these	factors	justify	banks	being	regulated	more	like	public	utilities	–	and	particularly	in	the	pricing	and	service
quality	areas.
_______
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	article	published	in	the	Journal	of	Economic	Policy	Reform.
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